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Abstract 
This paper compares and asks how Japan’s ‘new’ ODA Charter is influencing the direction of its aid policy 
to Lusophone Africa - so-called Portuguese-speaking African Countries of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-
Bissau, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe (PALOP) - in light of the TICAD process. The topic 
relates to Japan’s shift from traditional humanitarian and development ODA towards a more strategic 
agenda on behalf of the private sector, which in turn requires us to assess how the latest Development 
Cooperation Charter compared to previous ones and how it reflects each of them. This paper finds that 
although the ‘new’ Charter benefits both sides it openly favors resource-rich Angola and Mozambique at 
the expense of development in the poorest PALOP. It concludes that Japan’s public-private partnerships 
are playing a transformative role in PALOP in line with TICAD and the Africa Mining Vision, moving 
beyond the simple exploitation of natural resources towards broad-based sustainable growth.   
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Over the last decade global political stability and economic reforms in Lusophone 
Africa have increased Japan’s availability, through the Tokyo International Conference on 
African Development (TICAD), to help the group of five Portuguese-speaking African 
Countries (Países Africanos de Língua Ofícial Portuguesa, PALOP: Angola, Cape Verde, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and Principe (hereafter, São Tomé) to achieve 
economic and social transformation for inclusive and sustained growth.  
It follows that all five countries, which became independent from Portugal in 1974, 
suffer from acute poverty and face severe human security problems resulting from post-
conflict state-building in the case of Angola and Mozambique and state fragility in the case 
of Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé. Cape Verde is the only one to have achieved the 2015 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Cape Verde is also the least affected by 
governance problems. However, like São Tomé and Guinea-Bissau it has Small Island 
Development State (SIDS) status meaning all five countries apart from Angola are highly 
dependent on foreign aid.  
While Japan’s allocation of ODA may be based on the recipients’ development needs, 
there are other factors such as the vast natural resources of Angola and Mozambique and the 
fishery stocks of Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and São Tome, but also their geopolitical 
importance and economic potential as a trade and energy bloc within the Community of 
Portuguese-speaking Countries (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, the CPLP). 
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This paper suggests a broader use of assistance other than ODA in tandem with Japanese 
and African interests.  
With the approval of Japan’s ‘new’ ODA Charter on February 10, 2015 renamed the 
‘Development Cooperation Charter’, this hypothesis gains strength as the Charter clearly 
states that “in light of Japan’s current economic and social situation, deepening its 
cooperative relations (…) with emerging and developing countries are the keys to its own 
sustainable prosperity”, which “will also lead to ensuring Japan’s national interests”.1  
With half of the world’s people living in a fragile situation there is increasing debate 
in the media about the implications of Japan’s ‘new’ Charter for development assistance. The 
problem relates to Japan’s shift from traditional humanitarian and development ODA toward 
a more strategic agenda on behalf of the private sector, which in turn requires us to assess 
how the ‘new’ Charter’ affects each of the PALOP countries.  
In mid-2011, Japan replaced some of its lost nuclear-generated power with low-
sulfur, heavy crude from sources in Angola, Gabon and Nigeria; in 2014 Japan was the third-
largest net importer of total crude oil and petroleum products in the world after the United 
States (US) and China.2  
One asks what influence this Charter has on the direction of Japan’s aid to PALOP 
in light of the TICAD process that links both Japan’s public and private interests with 
recipients’ developmental and conflict-affected needs. It follows that TICAD is currently the 
best partnership mechanism for Japan to cooperate in a South-South context with PALOP 
or any other African country.3 Like the ‘new’ Charter which explicitly excludes ODA as the 
preferred instrument for eradicating poverty through ‘quality’ growth, TICAD has also long 
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advocated the promotion of private sector activities as a complement to ODA to achieve the 
above ends. Further, given that TICAD has broadened Japan’s African diplomacy to include 
all countries independent of their size, development and conflict status, TICAD is currently 
Japan’s most important diplomatic and aid policy tool for creating comprehensive aid 
programs ranging from social and economic infrastructures to public health, medical care, 
agriculture, conflict prevention and post-conflict development, trade and investment 
activities.4 Hence the main line of analysis of Japan’s foreign aid policy to Africa extends 
beyond ODA as there is no explicit distinction between Japan’s assistance for Africa ‘with’ 
and ‘without’ TICAD. 5 
Whether the TICAD partnership is effective depends on whether it can serve both 
sides equally (Japan and PALOP), while fostering inclusive growth for all partners. Besides 
fisheries and mineral resources-related capacities, some PALOP countries do boast the 
conditions required to develop not only large-scale agricultural production but also the 
production of biofuel from non-food crop raw materials such as sugarcane - biofuel that 
could be produced without putting pressure on the country’s food security.6  
Here, Japan’s triangular cooperation (TrC) model, which refers to support for South-
South cooperation (SSC) initiatives, provides an alternative to the so-called ‘land-grab’ 
malady that is affecting the ProSAVANA project. Japan is changing TrC by engaging the 
private sector in the development process as a responsible development actor, increasing the 
chances of PALOP attaining specific Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly 
goals 1 (ending poverty), 2 (ending hunger, achieving food security and promoting 
sustainable agriculture), 3 (ensuring healthy lives), 9 (building resilient infrastructure, 
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promoting inclusive and sustainable industrialization and fostering innovation), and 17 
(revitalizing the global partnership for sustainable development, including SSC and TrC).  
One argues that the broader scope of Japan’s ‘new’ Charter with the inclusion of 
‘small island countries’ is benefiting the poorer Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé 
and the wealthier Angola and Mozambique and Japan in a ‘win-win’ partnership.7 The 
question is whether Japan’s aid to PALOP translates into ‘sustainable quality growth’ and 
‘poverty eradication through such growth’ to address ‘global challenges’ with regards the 




The few studies of Japan’s development cooperation with PALOP have mostly 
focused on Angola and Mozambique. Nevertheless, Carvalho analyzed Japan’s trade and 
investment relations with PALOP under Portuguese colonialism.9 Seabra reviewed Japan’s 
aid and trade relations with PALOP after TICAD-IV,10 and Carvalho compared China and 
Japan’s foreign aid policies and development modes to Lusophone Africa in the post-2000 
period. 11 Among other findings, a common conclusion is that a major goal of Japan’s 
economic cooperation has always been to secure a long-term supply of strategic resources. 
Available literature does not take into consideration the implications of Japan’s latest 
Development Cooperation Charter to PALOP in light of TICAD, which increases its 
relevance. 
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METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE 
 
This article explores the common identity of the five PALOP members within their 
geographical, economic and development diversity. It investigates both the policy and 
development effects of Japan’s assistance under the ‘new’ Charter and TICAD. It also 
examines the expectations and implications of Japan’s associate observer status at the CPLP 
with Lusophone Africa as a counterweight to China’s engagement in PALOP. The paper is 
structured as follows: After the introduction, Section Two contextualizes Japan’s 
development relations with PALOP post-independence. Section Three considers TICAD’s 
development, economic and political connections with PALOP before and after the ‘new’ 
Charter. Section Four examines the role of Japanese public-private partnerships (PPP) in 
enhancing broad-based sustainable growth, reviews Japanese aid flows to PALOP and, based 
on Japan’s International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Ex. Post and Ex. Ante Evaluations, 
presents the findings of 17 projects through qualitative methodology. Finally, it analyzes 
alternative strategies for coping with extractive resources maladies, food security and 
renewable energy sources. It concludes with an overview of the paper’s key findings.  
 
1. THE PALOP WORLD AND THE SHIFT IN JAPAN’S AID 
POLICY 
 
When the Cold War ended the PALOP’s socialist commitment weakened as 
members moved to multi-party politics following independence between 1973 and 1975.12 
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However, their transition to democracy was not peaceful; PALOP conflict-affectedness 
demanded a mixed strategy of development and security. Japan’s diplomacy was ‘forced’ to 
align with the international normative regime.  
At the 1991 DAC High-Level Meeting, Japan and other members agreed that human 
rights, democratization, accountability, the rule of law and a reduction of military expenditure 
were crucial to promoting good governance and sustainable development. In 1992, Japan’s 
first ODA Charter matched the above principles and TICAD began applying them from 
1993 onward. Japan’s contribution to Angola and Mozambique’s elections and peace 
processes in 1992 and 1993-95 respectively strengthened Japan’s non-military development 
cooperation through peacebuilding institutionalized at TICAD-III in 2003,13 presently 
applied in Guinea-Bissau. Despite the development needs of Cape Verde (CPV), Guinea-
Bissau (GBS) and São Tomé and Principe (STP) their transition to multi-party elections in 
1991 and market-oriented economy was not enough to attract Japanese ODA.  
 
Japan’s Associate Observer Status at the CPLP: increasing expectations 
The ‘new’ Charter states that Japan will cooperate, taking advantage of its strengths 
through public-private partnerships. At the tenth CPLP summit in Dili, East Timor in 2014, 
with the support of Portugal, Japan gained associate observer status. As a result, Shinzo Abe, 
Japanese Prime Minister (hereafter, PM), stated that Japan would cooperate in the progress 
of member countries through the CPLP.14 Both sides agreed to further promote contact 
between Japanese firms and the CPLP’s business confederation, aimed at developing an 
economic dimension and business cooperation within the organization, and the signing of 
new partnership agreements towards the eradication of poverty, the promotion of inclusive 
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trade and sustainable development.15 According to Japan’s ‘new’ Charter these partnerships 
are expected to lead to economic growth and poverty reduction in partner countries. Japan’s 
associate observer status at the CPLP not only increases its trade expectations in a market of 
230 million people spread across four continents, but also offers a source of primary 
commodities and political and diplomatic soft power against China’s increasingly economic 
and institutional ties with the CPLP through the Macau Forum.16  
One should note that since 1996 when the CPLP (PALOP in Africa) was created it 
has grown from a cultural union to a geopolitical and economical community. This fact 
explains Japan’s growing interest as gas and oil from Angola, Brazil, Equatorial Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé represent more than 30% of global hydrocarbon 
production, equivalent to the current production in the Middle East. This means that the 
CPLP will be a major energy protagonist and future trade bloc on the international scene.17  
 
2. TICAD’s CONNECTIONS WITH PALOP BEFORE AND 
AFTER THE ‘NEW’ CHARTER 
 
The preceding section reviewed the background of PALOP and focused on the 
expectations Japan created with its associate observer status at the CPLP. This section 
examines the changes the ‘new’ Charter brings to TICAD diplomacy, reviews Japan’s aid 
policy to PALOP since its inception, and then explores the relevance of TICAD for 
PALOP.  
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The ODA Charters  
Following the launch of the ODA Charter of 1992, which referred to Africa as a 
region for which it was ‘necessary to be mindful of the poverty and the economic difficulties’, 
the revised Charter of 2003 emphasized the importance of increasing ODA for peacebuilding 
ends such as demining, economic reconstruction and social rehabilitation from a human 
security perspective18, which explains why Angola and Mozambique would became such 
important countries to TICAD.19 In contrast with previous charters the ‘new’ one explicitly 
puts TICAD at the center of Japan’s development assistance and emphasizes that ‘Japan will 
continue to actively engage in assistance for peacebuilding and assistance to fragile states 
from the perspective of human security’.20 It is worth mentioning that TICAD diplomacy 
also differs from Japan’s previous African diplomacy as it not only called the world’s 
attention to the challenges of development in Africa, but it also made Angola and 
Mozambique priority countries as they reflected Japan’s basic human security and 
peacebuilding policies enacted in the last two charters and the TICAD process.21  
The political, diplomatic and economic-resource relevance of Angola and 
Mozambique to the TICAD process since its inception contrasts with the irrelevance of Cape 
Verde, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé. This began to change between the fourth and fifth 
TICADs in 2008 and 2013 respectively. Furthermore, the focus of TICAD-IV on the MDGs 
rendered the progress made by Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and in particular, Cape Verde more 
relevant to the TICAD process itself. This, combined with several events in the countries 
under review and Japan’s wish to join the CPLP, seems to have contributed to increasing aid 
flows to PALOP.22  
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Finally, in terms of Japan’s foreign aid policy, the latest Charter presents two gains. 
Firstly, it introduces the notion of ‘quality growth’, or growth that is inclusive, sustainable 
and resilient, and complements TICAD-V’s three pillars (first, a robust and sustainable 
economy; second, an inclusive and resilient economy; third, peace and stability). Secondly, it 
openly states the importance of ‘ensuring Japan’s national interests’, which the previous 
ODA Charters of 1992 and 2003 did not.  
 
The relevance of TICAD for Africa and PALOP: development, economic and 
political connections 
When the TICAD process was launched in 1993, PALOP states, like most African 
countries, were in transition from a one-party state to multi-party democratic elections. 
Meanwhile, while Africa was being sidelined TICAD-I called global attention to African 
development and the sharing of African experiences through South-South cooperation 
(SSC). And, although Japan’s aid volume to the continent as a whole was not visible as ODA 
pledges ranged between US$650-750 million from 1993 to 1998, for the first time since the 
Cold War23 Japan engaged in conflict-affected countries, helping their transition from war to 
development. As a result, following TICAD-I, Japan’s assistance to Angola and Mozambique 
emphasized landmine removal assistance.24 In the Tokyo Agenda for Action (TAA) which 
TICAD-II adopted in 1998, African countries were called on to apply the twin concepts of 
‘ownership’ and ‘partnership’, first promoted in the OECD/DAC New Development 
Strategy Report Shaping the 21st Century of 1996. The problem was that within PALOP, 
Mozambique was the only country that offered the political conditions and economic 
viability necessary for it to be worth considering it a priority nation by the Japanese 
government,25 and worth further strengthening the emerging partnership for sustainable 
        WP 153/ 2017 
 
 
Mais Working Papers CEsA / CSG disponíveis em 
http://pascal.iseg.utl.pt/~cesa/index.php/menupublicacoes/working-papers  
13 
development within TICAD-II.26 In order to reinforce the partnership, Japan opened an 
embassies in Mozambique in 2000 and in Angola in 2005 and a JICA office in Mozambique 
in 2003 and in Angola in 2007. However, the absence of Japanese embassies and JICA offices 
in Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé created a political vacuum between Japan and 
these PALOP nations, thus hindering the twin concepts stressed in the TAA. This void was 
only filled between TICAD-IV and V.  
As the five case studies below will show, from 1974 to 1990 development 
cooperation ties between Japan and PALOP members were almost non-existent as most of 
them were engulfed in serious economic governance problems and political instability. The 
ODA Charter of 1992 clarified the philosophy and the principles, while the revised Charter 
of 2003 emphasized the priorities (poverty reduction, sustainable growth, global issues, and 
peacebuilding) of Japan’s foreign aid policy.27 Because there is no distinction between aid 
‘through the TICAD processes and ‘non-TICAD’ aid, one can say that TICAD policies 
translated these principles into projects and programs to be used by African countries 
towards their development.28 It became a diplomatic platform through which PALOP 




The first economic cooperation agreement between Cape Verde and Japan was 
signed in 1979.29 The links between Cape Verde and France and Portugal kept Japan away.30 
Despite being resource-poor and highly dependent on aid to cover food needs, the 
achievements of Cape Verde on the MDGs, a major priority of TICAD-IV, earned the Small 
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Island Developing State (SIDS) promotion from the list of Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) in 2008 to that of Middle Income Countries (MICs). In addition, its vast fishery 
resources boosted Japan’s renewed interest.  
So TICAD-IV created the possibility for Cape Verde to benefit from Japan’s 
concessional loans. Accordingly, in 2011, Japan was asked to integrate the Budget Support 
Group along with other development partners.31 In line with TICAD and to comply with the 
MDGs, Japanese aid financed the Transformation Strategy and the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Strategy Paper (GPRSP) focusing on agriculture, the judicial system, energy, water 
and basic sanitation, health and fisheries.32 
Following the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in 2009, Japan 
provided Cape Verde a fund of US$890,000 to support development projects for the 
sustainable use of fishery resources in African countries bordering the Atlantic.33 As a result, 
in 2010, JICA upgraded the port-fishing facilities in the island of Mindelo em Sao Vicente, 
to the value of €2.7 million.34 And, in 2014, 14 ships from Japan were licensed and their catch 
totaled 1,371 tons.35 Because few Cape Verde vessels are able to operate to the limits of its 
EEZ, Cape Verde’s fishing policy is to provide access to foreign fleet operators from the 
EU, Japan and Senegal to exploit its oceanic fishery resources.36 
Finally, to continue supporting Cape Verde’s transition from a lower to a middle-
income country and to help it towards the Post-2015 Development Agenda, in a 2013 
TICAD-V summit meeting Japanese Prime Minister Abe assured Cape Verde’s Prime 
Minister José Maria Neves a new Yen loan for the improvement of water supplies using 
Japanese technology. 37  
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Already considered the first narco state of Africa, since independence in 1974 
Guinea-Bissau has been prone to socio-political crisis and fragility. No president has been 
able to serve a full term in office. In the last ten years alone, the country has experienced civil 
war in 1998/99 and consecutive military coups in 1999, 2003, 2008, 2012 and 2015.38 Such 
events explain why Bissau is virtually a post-conflict country. As a result, Japan suspended 
ODA to Guinea-Bissau from 2004 and 2007 and barred Bissau from participating in TICAD-
IV and V. Although Japan is not a traditional donor to Bissau, the growing importance of 
Bissau in Japan’s peacebuilding and development agenda mixed with economic diplomacy is 
clear, as reflected for example in the USD 128.5 million in ODA from 2009 to 2013.39 
With few natural resources, the interest Guinea-Bissau holds for Japan results from 
its fishery stocks and its need for Bissau’s vote to obtain a majority in support of its whaling 
agenda launched in late 1990s. In this context, the visit to Japan of PM Caetano Ntchama in 
2000 and the training workshop held in Tokyo in 2001 for representatives from six West 
African states, including Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, revived relations between the two 
countries.40 This workshop reminded Guinea-Bissau of the importance of the whales-eat-
fish issue in Japan. Not surprisingly, political instability, persistent poverty and drug 
trafficking in Guinea-Bissau led the government of its Prime Minister N’Dafa Cabi to request 
the UN Security Council include the country on its Agenda of Peacebuilding Commission 
(PBC) in July 2007. 41 Following the visit by Japanese ambassador Yukio Takasu, Chairperson 
of the PBC, to Guinea-Bissau in April 2008, critical peacebuilding priorities were identified.42 
These included building governmental capacity, public sector reform, strengthening the rule 
of law, security sector reform and assisting the electoral process. Stopping drug trafficking 
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and organized crime, promoting human resources development, addressing the needs of 
vulnerable groups and rehabilitating infrastructure were also included. At Takasu’s request, 
Japan enacted an ODA rolling plan for Guinea-Bissau in 2010 and, in line with TICAD-IV, 
began coordinating assistance with the UNPBC to Guinea-Bissau, focusing on political and 
social security.43  
Following the military coup of April 2012, Japan donated a further USD 44,800 to 
support the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mission in Guinea 
Bissau.44 In 2014, Tokyo contributed a further US$10 million to the UN Peacebuilding Fund 
(UNPBF) also used to support the presidential elections held in Bissau in 2014.45  
 
São Tomé and Principe 
Since 2010 the African Development Bank has classed São Tomé as a fragile state.46 
The small archipelago shares a recent discovery of oil with East Timor, a fragility driven 
mainly by poverty, economic vulnerability and lack of infrastructure with Guinea-Bissau and 
climate change and erosion problems with Cape Verde.   
As with Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, Japan established diplomatic relations with 
São Tomé following the country’s independence in July 1975. However, by 1963 Japanese 
vessels were already involved in the transshipment of fishery products in São Tomé waters.47 
After the first multi-party elections in 1991, political instability, increasing poverty among 
São Tome's 170,000 inhabitants and corruption scandals involving the former PM Maria das 
Neves over the sale of USD 1.3 million of rice donated by Japan in 2004 prevented closer 
bilateral relations between the two countries.48 Despite the participation of São Tomé in the 
second and third TICAD, in line with the ODA Charter of 1992, Japan suspended ODA to 
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the tiny archipelago from 2004 to 2006, resumed in 2007 for humanitarian reasons to tackle 
poverty.49   
Like Cape Verde, São Tome’s fishery sector is dominated by traditional, small-scale 
fishing activities, which makes Japanese assistance in the sector highly important in 
promoting inclusive and sustainable economic growth. As a result in 2008, two months 
before TICAD-IV and in return for USD 1.3 million of aid in rice, technical and financial 
assistance as well as fishing training for São Tomé staff, and a new fishing agreement was 
also signed with Japan, allowing Japanese fishing vessels to fish for tuna in its EEZ.50 One 
should note that fishing is the major activity in São Tome’s coastal communities and 
represents four percent of GDP. It also provides employment, income for communities and 
protein for poor households.51 
It is expected that the oil sector will become the main growth driver of São Tome’s 
economy. Since 2003, Chevron, Canada-based Addax Energy and its subsidiary China 
Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (SINOPEC) have acquired tenders of offshore 
petroleum reserves.52 These companies have not found amounts worth exploiting 
commercially; dampening their early enthusiasm including that of Japan which besides 
reaffirming its support for São Tomé at TICAD-V (2013), has not demonstrated any 
particular interest in exploiting the archipelago’s oil resources.   
 
Angola and Mozambique 
The post-conflict affectedness of these two natural resource-rich countries turned 
them into a model for the TICAD-III (2003) three-pillar framework (human centered 
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development, poverty reduction through economic growth, and consolidation of peace), as 
the legacy of the war required an integrated approach to rebuild the countries. Since then the 
application of Japan’s ‘new’ Charter in both countries comes as no surprise as following 
TICAD-IV (2008) JICA and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) began 
promoting self-reliance development for both countries.  
In 2012, JBIC financed three buyers’ credit agreements for the export of textile 
manufacturing machinery made by Toyota Industries Corporation and Murata Machinery 
for rebuilding state-run textile manufacturing plants.53 These loans also facilitated Japanese 
oil trading and infrastructure-related companies in Angola such as Sojitz Corporation, 
Marubeni, Sumitomo and INPEX (2015), a subsidiary of Japan Oil Development Co. 
(JODCO), which acquired a 9.99% indirect interest in the oil producing Angola Block 14 in 
2013 with plans to further expand exploration production activities until 2035.54  
In 2015, a ‘development policy loan’ via JICA for sector reforms worth US$200 
million was signed with Angola.55 Compared with previous loans this one is in line with the 
‘new’ Charter, as Angola has to meet three conditions: It needs to start issuing multiple-entry 
visas for Japanese citizens, improve international remittance services and revise private 




Prior to TICAD IV, the joint trade and investment mission of MOFA and the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) to Mozambique decided that to reduce 
the risks of Japanese firms involved in the mining sector Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National 
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Corporation (JOGMEC) would be used to promote resource development.57 Thus that same 
year Japan’s Mitsui Corp. acquired a percent interest in the Mozambique Offshore Gas Area 
with 75 percent funding from JOGMEC.58     
Following the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, securing a stable supply of 
energy in Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) has become critical to Japan as a replacement to lost 
nuclear capacity. The gas reserves discovered in Mozambique in 2010, the largest in Africa, 
attracted US Anadarko Petroleum which, in 2014, signed a non-binding agreement with 
Mitsui to supply natural gas in the form of LNG to Japan.59 Also in 2011, JBIC agreed on a 
loan worth USD 4.8 million for Sojitz Maputo Cellulose to produce wood chips and export 
them Japan as a raw material for paper production.60  
In January 2014, PM Abe paid a visit promised at TICAD-V and established a 
Development Initiative based on natural coal and gas, a so-called ‘Amizade’ (friendship in 
Portuguese) with Maputo with an assistance package of USD 670 million to further develop 
the Nacala region.61 This visit resulted in the signing of a MoU between JBIC and 
Mozambique’s Ministry of Mineral Resources (MIREM) to facilitate mutual capacity-
building and the implementation of mineral resources-related projects in Mozambique.62 As 
a result, Mitsui has agreed with Brazilian firm Vale’s subsidiary to participate in the Moatize 
coal mining project and the Nacala Corridor rail and port infrastructure project which Vale 
had been operating in Mozambique.63  
It seems evident that Japan’s priority policy for development cooperation in 
Mozambique is strategically focused on the exploration of natural and mineral resources. It 
should be added that in May 2013, prior to TICAD V, METI re-endorsed the Africa Mining 
Vision (AMV) established in 2009 and organized the first Japan-Africa Ministerial Meeting 
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for Resources Development (JAMM). 64 Since then there is an effort of both parts to shift 
from simple natural resources extraction to ‘transparent, equitable and optimal exploitation 
of mineral resources to underpin broad-based sustainable growth and socio-economic 
development’.65 JAMM’s plan is for Japan to partner with Japanese private businesses in 
promoting the basis of an African resource industry with social and economic infrastructure 
capable of realizing inclusive growth. In addition, JAMM aims to strengthen human resource 
development applying safety, environmental and sustainable standards while meeting the 
needs of local communities. 66  
Based on this, the final section draws attention to Japanese firms’ contribution to 
overall sustainability. It also assesses JICA’s projects and explores Japan’s South-South and 
Triangular cooperation (TrC) initiatives to cope with the challenges of energy and food 
insecurity by delivering ‘quality’ and sustainable economic growth with productive 




3. JAPAN’S ‘NEW’ CHARTER: BOSTING SUSTAINABLE 
THROUGHT DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 
 
Compared with previous charters the ‘new’ Charter is broader in scope as is designed 
to be in line with the priority themes of TICAD-V: a robust and sustainable economy; an 
inclusive and resilient society and peace and stability. Accordingly, such growth should be 
attained through ‘inclusiveness’, ‘sustainability’ and ‘resilience’ as a force of equity and social 
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empowerment that includes all people at risk of exclusion and marginalization so as to build 
a peaceful, sustainable and secure society within the concept of human security. 67 
Within this context, the Japanese government has offered support to the notion of 
the corporate social responsibility (CSR) of private Japanese companies in Africa through 
public-private partnerships.68 Although there is no accepted definition of CRS, the 
companies who integrate societal concerns into their business policies and operations - 
including environmental, economic and social concerns - can be said to practice a CRS 
approach.69  
Within Japan’s development cooperation, this new kind of sustainable business is a 
new strategic approach of METI that addresses the bottom of the pyramid (BoP) needs of 
the poor through business partnerships with mutual benefits for both sides.70 As a result, the 
activities of Japanese companies are focused on inclusive business to achieve sustained, 
effective, economic cooperation, while allowing Japanese firms to make inroads into overseas 
markets.  
Thus Mitsui has been combining extractive resource development (titanium ore) with 
sustainable growth to increase agricultural productivity fueled by a solar-powered irrigation 
project for a farming community in the province of Gaza, Mozambique. This project is part 
of the Guardian Sustainable Business (GBS) program that the Japanese government has been 
carrying out through a Japan-UNDP partnership fund in more than 15 countries since 2003.71  
In addition in 2009, as a collaborative initiative to end poverty, Mitsui & Co. agreed 
with the UNDP to invest US$2 million in a development assistance program in the Chibuto 
African Millennium Village (AMV).72 The Millennium Village program will increase 
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agricultural productivity through irrigation systems and contribute to improving the income 
of around 13,000 people living in the district.73 
In 2015, the Mitsui & Co. Africa Fund also donated US$70,000 to aid relief efforts 
in the areas affected by the floods in Northern Mozambique.74 
Another Japanese firm which has embraced corporate social responsibility is 
Sumitomo Corporation Africa with several projects in Kenya, Uganda, Madagascar, South 
Africa and Angola.75 As landmines destroy the very foundations of society be they social or 
economic, Sumitomo has been supporting the Japan Mine Action Service (JMAS) since 2008. 
Also, in cooperation with the Angolan Ministry of Health’s National Malaria Control 
Program, Sumitomo Chemical Co. has been helping efforts to eradicate malaria through the 
supply of insecticide-treated mosquito nets to the Angolan people. 76 
 
Aid volume  
A major part of TICAD’s efforts to end poverty, hunger and achieve food security, 
the first of the SDGs77, is through ODA. As Table 1 shows, from 1997 to 2013 Japanese 
ODA to Lusophone Africa have increased to all PALOP countries barring Guinea-Bissau 
due to its political instability. Mozambique receives the lion’s share of Japan’s aid within 
PALOP at US$1,153 million, followed by Angola (US$583 million), Cape Verde (US$328 
million), Guinea-Bissau (US$72 million) and São Tomé and Principe (US$35 million).  
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Findings of Ex-Post/Ex-Ante Evaluations 
The analysis of the 17 projects only looked at Mozambique, Angola and Cape Verde 
as JICA (or MOFA) evaluations for Guinea-Bissau and Sao Tome are not available. Project 
outputs included agriculture, health, education, water systems and economic infrastructure 
(bridges and roads) for Mozambique; water, health, transportation and energy for Angola 
and fishery, electricity and water systems for Cape Verde.  
Years Angola Mozambique Cape Verde São Tomé Guinea-Bissau
MDG achiever
1997 12,0 38,1 2,4 0,9 7,5
1998 17,9 40,6 2,8 1,4 11,6
1999 22,0 63,3 8,5 0,1 1,5
2000 25,1 29,3 11,6 1,4 ..
2001 23,2 41,1 4,2 1,1 0,2
2002 28,3 72,7 7,4 1,4 0,2
2003 33,5 38,4 12,7 1,4 0,1
2004 26,9 22,7 4,2 1,5 0,0
2005 29,2 20,1 2,9 1,8 0,1
2006 15,9 106,8 3,5 0,1 0,1
2007 26,0 38,5 2,3 3,3 1,2
2008 17,8 29,9 6,9 7,2 6,6
2009 5,6 116,4 9,3 3,2 14,7
2010 130,9 21,9 5,3 2,6 13,3
2011 8,0 41,9 2,9 2,7 11,7
2012 153,9 152,6 75,3 2,7 0,0
2013 6,9 279,2 165,4 2,7 3,5
Total 583,0 1153,5 327,7 35,3 72,3
Note: São Tomé - São Tomé and Principe
Source: Author based on OECD.Stat, accessed 21 October, 2015, < http://stats.oecd.org/#>.
JBIC (Japan Bank for International Cooperation), <https://www.jbic.go.jp/en/efforts/support>.; 
Table 1. Japan Total Bilateral Net ODA to Lusophone Africa, 1997-2013 (USD million)
Conflict-affected Fragile States
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Overall, one can confirm that almost all projects were considered ‘effective’ as they 
attained their well-being objectives. Only three out of 17 projects were classified ‘Fair-B’ or 
‘Low’ while the remaining achieved a ‘High-A’. It follows that their impact, taking into 
account the positive and negative changes noted on completion of the projects, shows that 
most of them (12 out of 17 projects) achieved their initial outputs. However, their 
sustainability – i.e. whether the benefits will continue after Japan’s funding ceases - shows a 
different pattern. While the sustainability is not at risk in Angola, it is in Cape Verde and 
Mozambique. The major reason for this is the lack of financial resources or insufficient 
technical staff to ensure the maintenance of facilities (see Tables 2-4). This shortcoming has 
been corrected, for example in a recent JICA project in Mozambique for Capacity 
Development in Road Maintenance in 2014 through adequate training in Japan with high 
levels of understanding on the theoretical aspects of road maintenance technology.78  
 
Mozambique  
Based on the sixth Japan-Mozambique Policy Dialogue in 2011 and Japan’s 2013 
ODA rolling plan for Mozambique, JICA remains focused on helping Mozambique to go 
beyond the MDGs with projects for sustainable agriculture, health, education, water and 
sanitation, infrastructure and climate change.79 From Table 2 it can be seen that with regard 
to effectiveness/impact six out of eight projects were rated ‘High-A’ as objectives were 
achieved. However, their sustainability rated ‘Fair-B’ due to a lack of technical staff or 
insufficient financial resources for operation and maintenance.   
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In keeping with the TICAD process and long before it gained its associate status at 
the CPLP, Japan has been enhancing opportunities for TrC between Brazil and Lusophone 
countries such as Angola and Mozambique.80 In 2011, based on SSC Japan and Brazil 
launched the TrC project Tropical Savannah Agricultural Development in Mozambique 
(ProSAVANA). This triangular Japan-Brazil-Mozambique (JBM) partnership envisions the 
improvement of the livelihood of inhabitants along the Nacala corridor by increasing 
agricultural production with better crop varieties that enable the creation of employment 
Project Completion Effectiveness Impact Sustainability / Rating
Sector Date (High A; Fair B; Low C )
March Smale-scale farmers' techniques Fair B - as farmers High A - areas Fair B - as financial and
Agriculture 2010 in Chokew Irrigation Scheme adopted new cultivating rice in technical measures 
and income improved techniques for rice this area increased should be taken
(ProSAVANA-JBM) - Triangular Future effectiveness Fair - The Nacala High A - the creation of 
Agriculture 2012-30 cooperation for agricultural deve- depends of impro-  project has failed to cluster in the Nacala
(Ex. Post lopment among Japan-Brazil and ving agricultural understand the needs  Corridor will depend of
and Mozambique,  while taking into productivity farmers of the farmers more private investment and
Ex. Ante) account the environment and seeking market oriented rural/regional develop. involvement of small farmers
March The Institute of Health Science High A - objectives High A - practical Fair B - due to financial
Health 2006 of Quelimane improved the no. were achieved training classes aspects of operation
of courses and students improved and maintenance
March Construction of Chimoio Primary High A -  largely High A - certified Fair B - lack of financial
Education 2007 Teacher Training Center improved achieved its teachers improved resources and insufficient
(to All  the quantity/quality of teachers objectives in Manica province technical staff
children March Construction of Cuamba Teacher High A - Ratio of  High A - contributed Fair B - Concern about 
age 6-13 2009 Training Center, improved the  teachers rose from to highly qualified budget for incremental
by 2015) number of qualified teachers 62.9% (2006) to 88.1% (2011) graduates maintenance cost 
Groundwater for Rural Water High A - steady High A - as the no. Fair B - lack of technical 
Water February Supply in Zambezia improved the improvement from of diarrhea cases and financial capacity of 
2004 water-supply population in 98% 345,000 people to decreased from the Community Education
647,800 people 2000 to 2008 and Participation (PEC)
Construction of Bridges on Rural High A - weight High A - market, Fair B - Staff shortage to
Economic December Roads in Zambezia and Tete alleviated from 25 regional industry, properly maintain
Infrastructures 2010 Provinces as vehichle weight to 48 tons; traffic and economic trunk roads and bridges
was alleviated volume doubled growth expanded
The project for Capacity Develop High A - Capacity Fair B - ANE's High A - Trainings provi-
Transportation ment of Road Maintenance. Road of ANE is strengthe- capacity of road ded in Japan will enable
August inspection was improved. The road ned in terms of road maintenance was ANE to bridge the technical
2014 maintenance guidelines to revisit inspection, planning. enhanced. Exists gap in road repair works
basics of road maintenance techni- are expected to good prospects for in other provinces. 
ques was achieved. strengthen ANE's duplicating this achievement in other provinces.
Note: ANE - Mozambique National Road Administration (Administração Nacional de Estradas). 
Source: Author based on JICA Ex. Post Evaluations from 2007-2013, (n.d.),
 <http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/evaluation/tech_and_grant/project/ex_post/index.html>.
MOFA, 'Pro-SAVANA JBM', Quick Impact Project Report, March 2013,
 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shimin/oda_ngo/taiwa/prosavana/pdfs/03_shiryou_04.pdf>.
JICA, 'The Project for Capacity Development of Road Maintenance', Terminal Evaluation Result, August 2014, 
<http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/evaluation/tech_and_grant/project/term/africa/c8h0vm000001rp75-att/mozambique_2014_02.pdf>.
Project Name
Table 2.  JICA Projects by Type to Mozambique, 2004-2014: Findings from Ex. Post and Ex . Ante  Evaluations 
 and Major Output 
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through agricultural investment and the establishment of a wide value chain.81 However, fears 
of large-scale land acquisitions or ‘land grab’ have been a constant among Mozambican civil 
society organizations led by the National Peasants Union which accuses the JBM partnership 
of protecting large Brazilian agri-business and leaving them out of the ‘win-win’ 
partnership.82 Whether inclusive growth at a local level is being realized is debatable, as small 




When compared to other DAC donors, Japan’s aid volume to Angola is lower than 
to Mozambique. This is explained by Angola’s later peace in 2002 and subsequent transition 
from post-conflict reconstruction to development. Nevertheless, Japan is Angola’s second 
largest donor with a total of US$323.1 million from 2008 to 2013. Based on the consultations 
between Japan and Angola on economic cooperation in 2006 a country assistance policy 
(CAP) for Angola was drawn up. The assistance policy defined three priority areas, later 
addressed in the 2012 ODA rolling plan: (i) economic development with a focus on human 
resource development through education and vocational training, basic infrastructure 
development, and agriculture / food security (ii) the establishment of peace, mainly directed 
toward the social reintegration and resettlement of demobilized soldiers, internally displaced 
people and refugees, etc. and mine clearance and (iii) human security with a focus on health 
care.84  
Like Mozambique, with the exception of one project in the water sector the 
remaining projects in Angola (health, energy, infrastructure and transportation), largely 
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achieved the planned results, though not without problems. For example, although not 
affecting the ‘effectiveness’ or the final ‘impact’ of JICA’s ‘Rehabilitation of Port Facilities 
of Namibe and Lobito’ in Angola, the competition between China and Japan in bidding for 
projects affected implementation due to a drastic mid-project change. As a result, the 
National Reconstruction Office (GRN) excluded the Lobito Port from the project and 
included the Benguela Railway Rehabilitation Project financed through China’s International 
Fund. 85  
The paper finds that, in contrast to Mozambique, the evaluation of JICA’s projects 
in Angola shows that only one in five had financial problems with operation and maintenance 
(Table Three). In other words, the positive changes and benefits resulting from JICA’s 
intervention continued afterwards. An example is the Triangular Project for Capacity 
Building of the Angola Josina Machel Hospital that changed the paradigm in TrC as prior to 
this project this kind of cooperation between Japan and Brazil was small scale and for specific 
needs. 86 But, the ‘high’ effectiveness and impact of the Japan Brazil Partnership Program 
(JBPP) enabled further TrC on a larger scale in the Angolan health sector.  
Nevertheless, security measures and training can be improved (Table 3). Basically, 
the sustainability of JICA’s projects in Angola was affected by a lack of transparency in 
decisions rather than by financial problems. An example of this was the ‘Project for 
Emergency Rehabilitation of Port Facilities of Namibe and Lobito’ (Table 3) which, barring 
changes in the top-down action of the GRN under the direct control of the President of 
Angola, is likely to affect future policy consultations between both governments. 
Notwithstanding, given the fragile governance of the Angolan government there is room to 
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improve the project implementation process, as the importance of bilateral agreement was 
not fully understood by the Angolan side.87  
  
Japan and PALOP South-South Initiatives: Sustainable Agricultural, Industrial 
and Fishery Cooperation  
Another issue that is at the top of the South-South and Triangular cooperation 
agenda between Japan and PALOP and which takes into account concerns over food security 
and environmental degradation is the bio-fuel sector. From an industrial trade and 
development perspective, the 2007/2008 global food crisis, and more recently so-called 
‘land-grab’ issues in Mozambique and the oil crisis in Angola, have prompted these two 
Project Completion Project Name Effectiveness Impact Sustainability / Rating
Sector Date  and Major Output (High A; Fair B; Low C )
March Emergency Rural Water Low C - number  Fair B - ratio High A - no financial 
Water 2008 Supply around Luanda of deep wells water supply problems in operation
achieved the  objective to was far below increased to and maintenance; but 
supply water to 70 villages 39 in 177 target 44% room to improve training
The Improvement of Josina High A - quantity High A - solid High A - No financial 
Health August Machel Hospital - repair / and quality of and medical problem in operation 
2005 extension of facilities health services waste treated. and maintenance as it 
implemented as planned largely improved Absence of is the best hospital in 
Bed number increased from 400 to 534 (2010) negative impact the country
The Triangular Project for High - A improved High A - mortality High - A no financial  
Health March Capacity Building of Angola administration rate reduction of problems as this project
(1st JBPP-TrC) 2010 Josina Machel Hospital saw services, technical  1%; contributed enabled further TrC in 
(Brazil-Angola improvement of training  activities, nursing regular JBPP-TrC Angolan health sector
Japan) and quality of services care, training courses for 700  medical and hospital health staff 
Emergency Rehabilitation High A - Cargo High A - gross Fair B - Although there 
Transportation March of Port Facilities of Namibe handling volume tonnage and no. were no financial issues
2011 and Lobito (later excluded); has strongly of ships increased safety problems could
Nevertheless, the project increased from Business has arise as maintenance is
largely achieved the results 2010 to 2013 expanded not properly addressed
Power Sector Reform Reform the power
Energy August Support Program aims to sector through 
(Ex. Ante 2015 strengthen efficiency and improving 
Evaluation) competitiveness in the budgetary 
power sector reliability to attract foreign direct investment
Note: TrC - Triangular Cooperation under Japan Brazil Partnership Programme (JBPP). 




Table 3.  JICA Projects by Type to Angola, 2005-2015: Findings from Ex. Post and Ex. Ante Evaluations 
development in the country
Increased transparecy and public financial
management is expected, thereby
contributing to sustainable economic
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Lusophone countries to power their agriculture and gas resources to diversify their industry 
output whilst contributing to more inclusive development and climate change mitigation.88 
However, this form of industrialized agriculture also has negative environmental impacts 
including the increased use of agrochemicals, soil erosion and water pollution.89  
In response to the global demand for biofuel both developed and developing 
countries have been introducing biofuel policies. In 2009, Mozambique approved a National 
Policy and Strategy for Biofuels, which identifies biofuel as a high priority resource for 
Mozambique’s energy security and economic development.90 In 2010, the Parliament of 
Angola approved a law, which allows foreign companies to produce biofuel in the country if 
they ensure that the local population has access to water, basic services and medical care. 
Foreign companies are also required to sell a portion of their biofuels to the state oil company 
Sonangol to supply the local market.91 As for Japan, following the 2011 earthquake its 
imports of energy for generating power increased by approximately US$30 billion.92 Hence, 
in April 2014 the Japanese government published its Basic Energy Plan. Accordingly, all oil 
refiners are required to supply 500 million liters (crude oil equivalent) of biofuels by 2017, 
mainly for energy security, to fight global warming and to revitalize regional economies.93  
Given that most ethanol in Japan is imported, METI is collaborating with JOGMEC 
to introduce biofuels into the market. In this context, biofuel production has strong technical 
synergies with the established sugar industry in Mozambique and in Angola bio-ethanol is a 
strong candidate to add value to sugar cane activity. Within the CPLP framework, 
Mozambique, which produces two million tons of raw materials from sugarcane, has already 
signed cooperation projects with Brazil and Portugal and attracted foreign investors from 
Brazil, the EU, India, China and Japan.94  
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Also, since 2010, the University of Tokyo has been cooperating with Mozambique to 
reduce CO2 emissions, improve the lives of local residents and promote local industry. These 
goals have been achieved through cultivating biodiesel fuel plants that are not suitable for 
crop cultivation in arid regions and by using the resulting solid fuel to produce 
environmentally-friendly fuel to replace the firewood and charcoal that are currently major 
sources of fuel in Mozambique.95 In addition, Mozambique’s gas reserves can also be used 
to produce fertilizer that could benefit small farmers and local industry. Japan’s Toyo and 
Sumitomo have also presented two fertilizer projects, while Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Marubeni 
have proposed producing methanol for export to Japan.96  
In Angola, Marubeni is building a US$650 million97 factory which will be able to 
produce 400,000 tons of sugar and 40 million liters of ethanol. In combination with sugar 
cane plantations, 15,000 jobs will be generated, thus revitalizing a community in which many 
people work in neighboring Namibia.98 Hence, both countries have important alternative 
development opportunities for promoting industrialization, ultimately increasing the 
likelihood of achieving the SDGs that replaced the MDGs. 
 
Cape Verde  
In Cape Verde, about 50% of the people are engaged in agriculture and fishing. With 
44% of the population living below the national poverty line, Japanese aid has focused on 
basic human needs and the fishery sector, targeting poverty reduction and social equality in 
line with TICAD. Since the graduation of Cape Verde from LDC status in December 2007, 
Japan has shifted its focus to ODA loans. As a result, in 2010 Japan was the major bilateral 
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donor to Cape Verde followed by Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the 
United States.   
In line with TICAD IV-V priorities to ‘accelerate growth’ towards a ‘robust and 
sustainable economy’ and an ‘inclusive and resilient society’ JICA signed two yen-loans in 
2012-13 with the small island worth US$78.8 and US$150 million to finance electricity 
supplies necessary to the archipelago and freshwater through the desalination procedure in 
the poor rural areas of Santiago Island (Table 4).99  
Another strategic sector for economic growth and poverty reduction in the country 
is the fishery sector as marine products account for 76.8% of total exports in Cape Verde. 
The Mindelo Fishing Port project has partially achieved its planned objectives to increase 
capacity for freezing and cold storage and fishing vessels.100 However, the demand for ice 
has decreased due to an increase in the volume of fish going to Frescomar, a company that 
buys landed fish directly from fishermen. This is having an impact on the long-term viability 
of the project and the sustainability of the Fishing Complex. 101 
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With the outbreak of the civil war in 1998, Japan asked Senegal for cooperation in 
evacuating 17 Japanese citizens from the strife-torn country. As can be seen in Table 1, 
afterwards Japanese aid flows declined. Bilateral relations with Guinea-Bissau were 
normalized in 2007, and in 2010 Japan endorsed an ODA rolling plan focused on poverty 
reduction with projects related to basic human needs in four major sectors. These covered 
agriculture, education, health and social and economic infrastructures in the country.102  
Project Completion Project Name Effectiveness Impact Sustainability / Rating
Sector Date  and Major Output (High A; Fair B; Low C )
Extension of Facilities at Fair B - fish going  Fair B - fishermen Fair B - Fishing Complex
Fishery February Mindelo Fishing Port, to local markets motivation to buy lacks revenue to cover 
2009 achieved the objectives decreased 50%; appropriate volume maintenance costs, includes
of stable supply of ice and price of ice of ice based on electricity and water. 
for fishing boats increased quality standards decreased, affected by ice price 
Power Generation, It is expected that It will allow desali- There are technical risks
Electricity March Transmission, Distribution the diesel power nating saltwater to due to lack of expertise 
(Ex. Ante 2008 Capacity Building Project plant provides drinking water; it and financial future costs
Evaluation) expects to achieve the stable supply of will raise people's to ensuring regular 
objectives to supplying and improve access standard of living maintenance of facilities
electricity for the economy to electricity by supplying electricity to other health and services.
Electricity Transmisson The project expects Expects to improve Based on past projects
Electricity March Distribution Network to meet demand living conditions of electricity must be 
(Ex.Ante 2012 Develop. expects to for healthcare, people by reducing afordable to poor residents
Evaluation) increasing energy supply social services and electricity costs, Financial future costs for
to secure water resources desalination water to local residents maintenance should arise
Water Supply System Expects to connect To promote poverty Operation and maintenance
Water December Development Project, regional water reduction, social costs should arise
(Ex.Ante 2013 expects to increase fresh systems, improve development houselhold with desalinated 
Evaluation) water across the island living conditions water supply from 54.6% to 95% by 2020
Source:  Author based on  JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) Ex. Post and Ex. Ante Evaluation Projects, as follows: 
JICA, The Project for Extension of the Facilities at Mindelo Fishing Port , Republic of Cape Verde, November 2013, 
<http://www2.jica.go.jp/en/evaluation/pdf/2012_0709200_4.pdf>.
JICA, Power Generation, Transmission and Distribution Capacity Building Project on Santiago Island, March 2008,
<http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/evaluation/oda_loan/economic_cooperation/c8h0vm000001rdjt-att/capeverde01.pdf>.
JICA, Electricity Transmission and Distribution Network Development Project, March 2012, 
<http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/evaluation/oda_loan/economic_cooperation/c8h0vm000001rdjt-att/capeverde120330_01.pdf>.
JICA, Water Supply System Development Project in Santiago Island, Republic of Cape Verde, 
<http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/evaluation/oda_loan/economic_cooperation/c8h0vm000001rdjt-att/capeverde_131220_01.pdf>.
Table 4.  JICA Projects by Type to Cape Verde, 2008-2013: Findings from Ex. Post  and Ex. Ante Evaluations 
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The issue of peace and stability, a pillar of TICAD-V was further emphasized in the 
‘new’ Charter, which highlights their importance as “prerequisites for nation-building and 
development”. Japan’s recently appointed ambassador to Guinea-Bissau Takahashi Kitahara 
from Mitsui & Co met with the Government of Guinea-Bissau in July 2015.103 According to 
Kitahara without political stability and national reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau Japanese aid 
and economic cooperation is at risk.104 This reveals not only the synergy between the private 
sector and the importance of the development-security nexus, but also Japan’s need to 
expand foreign direct investments in line with the latest aid Charter and the TICAD process. 
In 2014, Guinea-Bissau was reintegrated as a full member of the CPLP after its suspension 
following the military coup in April 2012. 
 
São Tomé and Principe  
Given the lack of an ODA rolling plan, economic cooperation between Japan and 
São Tomé and Principe is based on an agreement signed in 1999 which takes the form 
annually of non-repayable food aid. Although the ‘new’ Charter highlights the SIDS, the low 
volume of ODA demonstrates that São Tomé and Principe is a low priority for Japan, 
provided that Japanese private interests in the rice and fishing sectors are safeguarded. It is 
clear that São Tomé and Principe uses rice as a strategic lever to achieve both food security 
and to fund other activities. 105 Under the food aid project signed in 2012 between both 
parties, Japanese firms are the only eligible tenderers to supply rice to São Tomé and Principe. 
The money made from selling the Japanese rice is deposited in a São Tomé state fund, which 
covered the cost of the legislative elections in 2010, and the presidential elections in 2011. 106 
In addition, Japan also co-funds fishing activities through fishing vessels, equipment and 
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Based on the comparative analysis of Japan’s ODA to Lusophone Africa, one can 
now answer the research question, which asked how the ODA Charter influences Japanese 
aid to PALOP in light of the TICAD process’s three pillar framework.   
Clearly, this Charter extends the possibilities for enhancing strategic development 
cooperation for inclusive growth in PALOP countries. This does not mean that the Charter 
in itself is the cause of Japan’s increased bilateral relations with PALOP. As section two 
shows, Japan’s development and economic relations with PALOP, prioritizing Angola and 
Mozambique, intensified after the Cold War particularly following TICAD-III in 2003. 
However, aid was mainly allocated to peacebuilding and development reconstruction. The 
remaining PALOP, despite their good governance reforms, did not seem relevant to Japan 
which opened embassies in Angola and Mozambique but not in Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau 
or Sao Tome.  
As section three demonstrated this trend began to change following TICAD-IV in 
2008. Several international and domestic factors such as the 2008 financial crisis, China’s 
strong engagement in PALOP and the Fukushima nuclear accident caused by the 2011 
earthquake and tsunami prompted Japanese enterprises to react and look at Angola, 
Mozambique and other PALOP as potential investments targets, which explains Japan’s wish 
to join the CPLP in 2014. However, it became evident that the priority that Japan gives to 
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each PALOP state differs, confirming our argument that although the Charter benefits both 
sides, Japanese public and private interests openly favor resource rich Angola and 
Mozambique at the expense of the smaller and poorest PALOP. Still the poorer PALOP’s 
fishery stocks, their diplomatic importance in supporting sustainable whaling and 
achievements on the MDGs, particular in the case of Cape Verde, cannot be sidelined nor 
can Japan’s foreign policy interests at the UN Peacebuilding Commission be ignored.  
This paper also finds that the little amount of Japanese ODA to the smaller group of 
PALOP-SIDS (Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and Principe) sustain the above 
and our assumption that, despite Japan’s moral responsibilities in view of its recent CPLP 
observer associate status and in the light of the ‘new’ Charter, Japan can and should do much 
more for the well-being of these three SIDS.  
Another reason explains (but not entirely) why aid flows were higher to Angola and 
Mozambique than to Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé. It relates to policy choices 
within these countries. Certainly, better governance particularly in Guinea-Bissau and São 
Tomé would improve bilateral ties as Japan would not need to suspend ODA. The opposite 
is also true. The paper has also confirmed that Cape Verde is a success story when it comes 
to achieving all or most of the MDG goals; nevertheless it still trails Angola and Mozambique 
with regards to ODA flows, despite a strong increase post TICAD-V. What the paper has 
confirmed, as promoted by TICAD and the latest Charter, is that the key to sustainable and 
inclusive growth is not development assistance (more ODA) itself, but rather development 
cooperation through public-private partnerships, increasing the chances of inclusive and 
‘quality’ growth to PALOP.  
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Our findings also show that the ‘new’ Charter has broadened and legitimatized 
Japan’s shift from a humanitarian and development aid policy toward a natural resource 
security policy ‘hidden’ in previous ODA Charters but currently promoted. The innovation 
of this Charter is evident in the development and social mission that the Japanese business 
sector is playing in PALOP in line with TICAD and the AMV beyond the simple exploitation 
of natural resources toward broad-based sustainable growth. Japanese firms’ (Mitsui and 
Sumitomo) corporate social responsibility in Angola and Mozambique in mining and energy 
sectors not only enable BoP business but also have synergetic effects with the Post-2015 
Development Agenda and South-South and Triangular cooperation initiatives in health and 
agriculture sectors.   
The article also presented findings from 17 projects with some contrasting results. 
Regarding their impact, only two out of the 17 projects were evaluated with ‘Fair-B’ and the 
remaining projects had ‘High-A’, meaning that overall, the targeted communities benefited 
immediately from the projects. However, their sustainability or lasting impact (after Japan’s 
funding has been withdrawn) is at risk due to financial and technical problems. Here, eight 
out of 14 projects (as the remaining three projects were Ex-ante evaluations) were classified 
with ‘Fair-B’. Those projects only scoring a Fair-B on sustainability because of lack of funds 
were mainly implemented in Mozambique and Cape Verde with only one in Angola. JICA is 
already working to ensure that cooperation with partner countries continues post-funding to 
avoid failure. Alternatively, the engagement of private investments or local companies can 
also guarantee longer benefits to local communities, hence its sustainability.  
In conclusion, although Japan’s aid policy to PALOP-SIDS is consistent with the 
‘new’ Charter and the TICAD framework, in contrast to Angola and Mozambique it seems 
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insufficient if the aim is to produce inclusive growth and development in terms of 
quantitative improvements, which could make a difference in, for example, income, 
employment, education, security or access to health services. On the whole we ought to 
conclude that Japan’s Development Cooperation Charter is not being applied fairly (fair 
distribution) across all PALOP, rather it is being used to promote Japan’s economic interests 
in the most resourceful PALOP members at the expense of the poorest. This outcome is not 
surprising given the longstanding cooperation between Japan and Mozambique and Japan 
and Angola when compared to the smaller PALOP and the lack of governance and political 
stability in the poorer PALOP. Nevertheless, the paper has demonstrated that over the past 
21 years TICAD has benefited Japan’s development cooperation with PALOP by 
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